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Bankruptcy and Insolvency as an Expanding Field:
An Historical Analysis of Reference Re Debt Adjustment Act, 1937
(Alta.)
Words: 14,082
By Virginia Torrie* & Thomas G.W. Telfer**
Abstract
The drought of the early 1920s and the economic collapse of the 1930s caused
unprecedented problems for farmers in Alberta. Low prices and poor markets caused farmers to
become overindebted. Parliament’s response to the situation was the Farmers’ Creditors
Arrangement Act, 1934 (“FCAA”), which was intended to create an alternative mechanism to
bankruptcy through which farmers could negotiate debt compromises with their creditors.
Parliament viewed the situation as a temporary issue, and the FCAA reflected this assumption. In
contrast, the prairie provinces sought long-term debt adjustment legislation for farmers and other
debtors affected by the Great Depression. In Alberta, two reformist social movements created new
legislation to alleviate the debt burden in the province. The United Farmers of Alberta created the
first Debt Adjustment Act (“DAA”) in 1923 to address the issue, which was then modified and
expanded in the later 1930s by the new Social Credit government. However, in its attempt to create
a robust debt adjustment scheme, the Social Credit government created a regime which
overstepped the bounds of provincial jurisdiction. In 1941, Alberta’s DAA was referred to the
Supreme Court of Canada where it was decided that the DAA was ultra vires the province as
legislation on bankruptcy and insolvency, an area reserved exclusively for the federal government.
The decision was upheld by the Privy Council in 1943. This article outlines the historical context
of the DAA, the basis for its invalidity, and argues that the impact of the reference decision was
the affirmation of a broad construction of the federal bankruptcy and insolvency power.
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1. Introduction
The Great Depression and the Dust Bowl of the 1930s profoundly impacted farmers in
Canada’s prairie provinces. Faced with falling princes and increasing debt caused by the
environmental and economic conditions of the time, provincial and federal governments enacted
legislation to help farmers facing insolvency. In 1934, Parliament passed the Farmers’ Creditors
Arrangement Act (“FCAA”) to provide relief for farmers facing insolvency as an alternative to
existing bankruptcy mechanisms.1 In Alberta many people in cities and towns were no better off
than farmers. Due to high unemployment, thousands lacked the money for necessities.2 In
response, the new Social Credit government of Alberta strengthened its Debt Adjustment Act
(“DAA”) to by expanding its scope to include all debtors, instead of only farmers. However, this
Act would meet a similar fate as many early Social Credit statutes, thirteen of which were declared
ultra vires by the courts or disallowed by the federal government.3 In 1941, the constitutionality
of Alberta’s Debt Adjustment Act, 1937 was referred to the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”),

1

Farmers’ Creditors Arrangement Act, 1934, SC 1934, c 53 [FCAA], amended by SC 1935, c 20, SC 1935, c 61. See
Virginia Torrie, “Federalism and Farm Debt during the Great Depression: Political Impetuses for the Farmers’
Creditors Arrangement Act, 1934” (2019) 82:2 Sask L Rev 203 at 207 [Torrie, “Federalism and Farm Debt”].
2
See John A Irving, “The Evolution of the Social Credit Movement” (1948) 14:3 The Can J Econ Political Sci 321 at
322.
3
Ibid at 332.
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which found it to be ultra vires as legislation on bankruptcy and insolvency, an area exclusively
reserved to the federal government.4
This article will review the Reference as to Validity of The Debt Adjustment Act (“DAA
Reference”).5 The paper adopts the framework for analysis first utilized in Debt and Federalism:
Landmark Cases in Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law, by placing the decision in its social
and political context.6 The article will examine the historical background of the DAA and the
reference case, review the arguments contained in the original factums and decision at the SCC
and on appeal to the Privy Council, and it will consider Alberta’s legislative approach after the Act
was found invalid. Ultimately, the DAA Reference expanded the body of jurisprudence that the
federal power over bankruptcy and insolvency should be interpreted broadly. The Debt Adjustment
Act decisions reinforced the finding that provincial schemes for the settlement of debt that include
an element of compulsion fall within Parliament’s jurisdiction, even in the absence of a formal act
of bankruptcy. Thus, the federal power over bankruptcy and insolvency can include matters of
contract and property which would normally fall within provincial jurisdiction.

2. Farm Debt Crisis
During the Great Depression, Canada experienced severe economic hardship. Canada’s
economy was especially vulnerable to the fluctuations of the global market due to its dependence
on exports.7 As the prices and demand for staple products collapsed, many Canadians were left
unemployed and desperate.8 Unemployment rates in Canada ranged from 2.5 to 4.2 per cent in
1929 rising to 19.3 to 27 per cent in 1933. By 1934, 2 million Canadians received some form of
public relief.9 The problem was critical for prairie farmers as crop values continued to decrease
throughout the early 1930s. The effect of falling prices was exacerbated as farmers had been able
to easily take on additional debt and expand thanks to high prices and yields in the late 1920s.
Because of their high debt load, many farmers were unable to make their payments when prices
collapsed in the 1930s. In Saskatchewan, for example, the situation was so severe that from 1930
to 1935 two thirds of the wheat available for sale would have been consumed by interest payments,
with most of the remainder being consumed by taxes.10
The high population of farmers in Alberta and the prairie provinces caused farm debt to
become a significant political issue.11 As low prices and drought continued with each passing year

4

Debt Adjustment Act, 1937, SA 1937, c 9; see Reference as to Validity of The Debt Adjustment Act, Alberta, [1942]
SCR 31, [1942] 1 DLR 1 [DAA Reference].
5
DAA Reference, supra note 4.
6
See Thomas G W Telfer & Virginia Torrie, Debt and Federalism: Landmark Cases in Canadian Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Law, 1894–1937 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2021).
7
Ibid at 103.
8
See Peter Neary (ed), Alan Caswell Collier, Relief Stiff: An Artist’s Letters from Depression-Era British Columbia
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2018) at 3.
9
See e.g., M. Horn, The Great Depression of the 1930s in Canada (Ottawa: Can. Hist. Assoc., Booklet No. 39, 1984)
at 7, 10; L. Campbell, Respectable Citizens: Gender, Family and Unemployment in Ontario’s Great Depression
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009) at 3.
10
See G E Britnell, “Saskatchewan 1930-1935” (1936) 2:2 Can J Econ Political Sci 143 at 160.
11
See Torrie, “Federalism and Farm Debt” supra note 1 at 208-9. See further, Donald H. Layh, A Legacy of Protection:
The Saskatchewan Farm Security Act: History, Commentary and Case Law (Langenburg, SK: Twin Valley Books,
2009) at 2.
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and farm debt became a more pressing issue, the prairie provinces faced pressure from farmers to
provide legislative relief, protecting them from debt enforcement efforts.12

3. Farmers’ Creditors Arrangements Act, 1934
In response to the possibility of Saskatchewan enacting robust debt moratorium legislation
that would make it nearly impossible for creditors to pursue debt enforcement proceedings against
farmers in that province, Prime Minister Bennett announced that his government would enact
federal debt legislation to assist farmers affected by the debt crisis.13 In 1934, the new FCAA came
into force, which was intended to be more moderate than Saskatchewan’s proposed legislation.14
The federal bill was announced as one of Bennett’s New Deal statutes, which were a series of
statutes branded as creating a new economic and social order, but really only provided for modest
changes.15 The FCAA created procedures for farmers to make arrangements for the disposal of
their debts with their creditors in order to avoid bankruptcy. While other bankruptcy and
insolvency legislation did not stay proceedings against secured creditors, an application under the
FCAA resulted in an automatic ninety-day stay of proceedings for both unsecured and secured
claims.16 Under the FCAA, a farmer could apply to a local Official Receiver, who would assist the
farmer in developing a compromise proposal. With the consent of the farmer’s creditors, the
proposal would be submitted to the court for approval. If the creditors did not consent, the farmer
could apply to the Board of Review, which could impose a compulsory proposal on the debtor and
the creditors. Most of these proposals included a reduction of the farmer’s debt coupled with an
extended repayment period.17
From the perspective of the prairie provinces, the FCAA was not as effective as they wanted
and needed. To give a sense of the scale of the issue, in 1936 total agricultural debt in
Saskatchewan amounted to $450 million, but debt reductions through federal and provincial
schemes had only amounted to $6.2 million.18
In 1935, the FCAA was amended such that the Act did not apply to any debt created after
May 1, 1935 without the consent of the creditors.19 In 1936, William Easterbrook wrote that the
net results of the FCAA had not been promising, and doubted that the Act had altered the situation
in the West to any appreciable extent.20 Easterbrook had recommended broadening the scope of
adjustment in order to avoid the need for more drastic action.21 In 1938, Parliament amended the

12

See Telfer & Torrie, supra note 6 at 104.
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
15
See Winnipeg Free Press (3 January 1935), cited in Alvin Finkel, Business and Social Reform in the Thirties
(Toronto: James Lorimer, 1979) at 36; Larry A Glassford, Reaction and Reform: The Politics of the Conservative
Party under R.B. Bennett 1927–1938 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992) at 173; W Christian & C Campbell,
Political Parties and Ideologies in Canada: Liberals, Conservatives, Socialists, Nationalists (Toronto: McGraw-Hill
Ryerson, 1974) at 96.
16
See Torrie, “Federalism and Farm Debt” supra note 1 at 236.
17
See Virginia Torrie, “Farm Debt Compromises during the Great Depression: An Empirical Study of Applications
Made under the Farmers’ Creditors Arrangement Act in Morden and Brandon, Manitoba” (2018) 41:1 Manitoba LJ
377 at 417.
18
See Britnell, supra note 10 at 166
19
See The Farmers’ Creditors Arrangement Act Amendment Act, 1935, SC 1935, c 20, s 8.
20
See W T Easterbrook, “Agricultural Debt Adjustment” (1936) 2:3 Can J Econ Political Sci 390 at 400.
21
Ibid at 401.
13
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Act again to provide that by December 1939, no new proposals could be received in any province
other than Alberta and Saskatchewan.22

4. Debt Adjustment Legislation in Alberta
There had been several iterations of debt adjustment acts in Alberta before the 1941
reference.23 The first statute of this type was passed in response to the Prairie Dry Belt Disaster,
when areas of southern Alberta experienced prolonged drought.24 The discontent among farmers
at that time lead to the growth of the United Farmers of Alberta (UFA), which was an agrarian
movement formed in 1909.25 In the Alberta election of 1921 the UFA ousted the previous Liberal
government and enacted the Drought Relief Act, 1922 to bring about arrangements between
debtors and creditors in areas affected by drought.26 The Act created a Commissioner who was
tasked with bringing about agreements between debtors and creditors and provided that no
proceedings against resident farmers could be taken except by leave of a judge.27
Alberta enacted the first version of the DAA in 1923.28 This Act established a Director, who
could, on application by a debtor or creditor, confer with both to attempt to bring about payment
of the indebtedness without recourse to legal proceedings. Upon application by a resident farmer,
the Director could prevent any proceedings for execution, foreclosure, or sale without leave of a
judge if the Director was satisfied that it would be in the interests of the farmer and their creditors.29
The farmer’s creditors could apply for leave to a judge on notice to the Director. Like the Drought
Relief Act, the Director’s power under the DAA to prevent proceedings only applied in certain areas
of the Province, which could be modified by the Lieutenant Governor in Council.30 In 1931 and
1933 the UFA passed new versions of the Act, which transferred administration of the scheme
from the Director to a Debt Adjustment Board and extended the application to the whole
province.31 These Acts prohibited actions by creditors for the enforcement of debts against farmers
without permission of the Board.32
In the early 1930s, the social conditions of Alberta changed to favour a new social and
political movement. At that time, farmers had experienced every agricultural ordeal, such as
drought, pestilence, and incredibly low crop prices.33 Being heavily mortgaged, many discouraged
farmers focused their resentment on the banks and loan companies.34 This unrest created the
circumstances for a new political force to take power. In Alberta’s 1935 general election, the new
22

See An Act to amend the Farmers’ Creditors Arrangement Act, 1934, SC 1938, c 47, s 9.
See DAA Reference, supra note 4.
24
See David C Jones, “Prairie Dry Belt Disaster” (4 March 2015), online: The Canadian Encyclopedia
<https://perma.cc/4C25-MB4G>. Drought on the prairies was a perennial issue for farmers. At this time, another
drought exacerbated debt crisis had occurred as recently as 1913. See Jeremy Adelman, “Prairie Farm Debt and the
Financial Crisis of 1914” (1990) 71:4 Can Historical Rev 491 at 506.
25
See Bradford James Rennie, Rise of Agrarian Democracy: The United Farmers and Farm Women of Alberta, 19091921, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000) at 36.
26
Drought Area Relief Act, 1922, SA 1922, c 43. See Jones, supra note 24.
27
See Drought Area Relief Act, 1922, supra note 26, ss 4, 8.
28
See Debt Adjustment Act, SA 1923, c 43.
29
Ibid, s 10.
30
Ibid, ss 7-9.
31
See Debt Adjustment Act, 1931, SA 1931, c 57; Debt Adjustment Act, 1933, SA 1933, c 13.
32
See Debt Adjustment Act, 1933, supra note 31, s 6(1).
33
See Irving, supra note 2 at 321.
34
Ibid at 321-322.
23
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Social Credit Party (“SCP”) won a landslide victory where no UFA candidates were elected.35
Shortly after the election, the SCP government passed the Debt Adjustment Act, 1936.36 The 1936
version of the Act allowed the Lieutenant Governor in Council to add any class of legal
proceedings to the list of actions that were prohibited without permission from the Board.37 Under
previous versions, the list of prohibited actions was definitively set out within the statute, but now
the government could expand the list as needed by order, which granted the executive the power
to bring virtually any proceeding within the ambit of the statute. The fact that this provision could
have allowed matters of federal jurisdiction to be incorporated into the Act was not relevant to the
eventual finding that it was ultra vires, likely because the codified prohibitions were sufficient to
find that the Act exceeded the Province’s legislative authority. In addition, this iteration of the
DAA removed the right of appeal previously available from a decision of the Board.38 The Act
prohibited the Board from granting permission in proceedings leading to foreclosure if
depreciation caused by abnormal economic conditions would lead to a sale for less than the
property’s ordinary value. This Act also extended protection to non-farmer debtors for the first
time, although, unlike farmers, relief was not granted to them automatically. For protection under
the Act, these non-farming debtors needed to prove to an Official Referee that it would be unjust
or unreasonable for creditors to pursue claims before any actions against the debtor could be
prohibited.39 When Alberta passed this Act, the Canadian Bankers’ Association (“CBA”) warned
that although it would not take any retaliatory action, this would make it more difficult for people
to secure money by way of bank loans.40 Lucian Maynard, the Social Credit minster who sponsored
the legislation, addressed concerns regarding the Act’s constitutionality, stating that there was no
doubt that the provinces alone had jurisdiction over debts. With respect to interest, Maynard argued
that the province could legislate on the subject as an incidence to another legislative purpose.41 He
was not reported to have made any comment on the issue of treading on the federal subject of
bankruptcy and insolvency, in relation to which the Act was later found ultra vires.
The DAA was again amended and consolidated into the Debt Adjustment Act, 1937.42 This
version still did not contain an option to appeal the Board’s decisions, as much of the SCP caucus
was opposed to the idea.43 With respect to the general prohibition against certain actions, this
version removed the distinction between a resident farmer and a debtor, instead relating more
broadly to resident debtors.44 Alberta amended this Act in 1937, 1938, 1939, and 1941.45 Notably,
35

Ibid at 330.
Debt Adjustment Act, 1936, SA 1936(2), c 3.
37
Ibid, s 8(1).
38
Ibid, s 8(5).
39
Ibid, ss 17-20.
40
See “Alberta Legislators Hear Views of Big Delegation”, Calgary Daily Herald (1 September 1936) 1, online:
<https://perma.cc/57H9-DUGA>. The debt adjustment legislation caused vendors of land to seek the advice of lawyers
on how to circumvent the legislation. See WG Morrow, “An Historical Examination of Alberta’s Legal System-The
First Seventy Years” (1981) 19 Alta L Rev 148 at 159.
41
See “Debt Reduction Act”, Calgary Daily Herald (1 September 1936) 3, online: <https://perma.cc/9Z6J-B3HU>.
42
Debt Adjustment Act, 1937, SA 1937, c 9.
43
See “Adjustment Act, Now Law Protects All Debtors”, Calgary Daily Herald (18 June 1937) 1, online:
<https://perma.cc/5UWD-5REX>.
44
See Debt Adjustment Act, 1937, supra note 42, s 2(e). Specific provisions remained for “resident farmers” with
respect to proposals made under the FCAA and chattel mortgages; see Debt Adjustment Act, 1937, supra note 42, ss
17-19.
45
See Debt Adjustment Act, 1937, Amendment Act, 1937, SA 1937(3), c 2; Debt Adjustment Act, 1937, Amendment
Act, 1938, SA 1938, c 27; Debt Adjustment Act, 1937, Amendment Act, 1938 (Second Session), SA 1938(2), c 5; Debt
36
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it was the 1941 amendment which finally added an appeal from the Board to a judge sitting with
a jury.46 It was this version of the Act that was the focus of the 1941 reference to the SCC.
The first SCP term was fraught with attempts at legislative reform that continued to be
disallowed by the federal government, but the DAA remained nominally valid.47 The federal justice
minister, Ernest Lapointe, felt that no useful purpose could come from disallowing the 1937 DAA,
as that would only revive the 1936 version which was largely the same.48 Lapointe believed that
reasonable objections could be raised against several of the later amendments, but the issue of
disallowance could be avoided as some provisions appeared to be clearly ultra vires.49
At the time of the DAA Reference, the Debt Adjustment Act, 1937, as amended, contained
the following provisions. The Act constituted a Debt Adjustment Board, the members of which
were appointed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council.50 Unless the Board issued written
permission, certain enumerated actions could not be commenced or continued against a debtor in
the province. This was a comprehensive list, and the Lieutenant Governor in Council could add
additional classes of actions.51 The Act prohibited the grant of a permit for actions in relation to
mortgages or agreements of sale if those proceedings would result in a foreclosure sale below
ordinary value because of abnormal economic conditions.52 On application by the debtor or
creditor, the Board was mandated to attempt to bring about an arrangement for the payment of the
indebtedness and was to attempt to reduce the debts in accordance with the debtor’s ability to
pay.53 In relation to debtor farmers specifically, a permit was required to sue a farmer who had
failed to carry out an agreement made under the FCAA.54 Board approval was also required to sue
on a chattel mortgage given by a farmer after May 1, 1934 as security for past indebtedness.55 The
Board could authorize a farmer to sell goods and chattels subject to a chattel mortgage to provide
for the necessities of live, livestock feed, or seed grain.56 Any appeal from the Board would go
before a judge with a jury of six people.57 The Act provided that if Parliament made legislation for
the adjustment of debts, the Lieutenant Governor in Council could suspend from operation any
part of the Act to prevent a conflict.58 The Act also contained a provision stating that it could not
be construed as authorizing anything outside of the competence of the legislature.59 This provision
was evidently included in an attempt to insulate the Act from a challenge on the basis that it
exceeded the Province’s jurisdiction. However, Alberta submitted no written arguments to the
Adjustment Act, 1937, Amendment Act, 1939, SA 1939, c 81; Debt Adjustment Act, 1937, Amendment Act, 1941, SA
1941, c 42.
46
See Debt Adjustment Act, 1937, Amendment Act, 1941, supra note 45, s 7.
47
See J R Mallory, Social Credit and the Federal Power in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976) at
105-108.
48
Ibid, at 109.
49
Ibid, at 110.
50
See Debt Adjustment Act, 1937, SA 1937, c 9, amended by SA 1937(3), c 2, SA 1938, c 27, SA 1938(2), c 5, SA
1939, c 81, SA 1941, c 42, s 3.
51
Ibid, s 8.
52
Ibid, s 9.
53
Ibid, s 21, 23.
54
Ibid, s 26.
55
Ibid, s 27
56
Ibid, s 28.
57
Ibid, s 36.
58
Ibid, s 38.
59
Ibid, s 39.
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SCC with respect to this provision, and only made brief reference to it in its Privy Council factum.
As will be seen below, the section was of no assistance to the province to avoid a finding that the
DAA was ultra vires in whole.
In 1939, the Alberta Supreme Court (Appellate Division) summarized the purpose of the
legislation:
These Acts were passed when debtors as a class throughout the country were in financial
distress and broadly speaking these Acts gave to the Board power to prevent a creditor from
using oppressively the machinery provided by law to enable a creditor to assert his rights
against his debtor. The aim of all these Acts is to protect the debtor by curtailing the
procedural rights of the creditor.60

5. Judicial History
The 1941 reference to the SCC was not the first time Alberta’s debt adjustment acts had
been challenged in court. The previous year, the SCC had considered section 8 of the Debt
Adjustment Act, 1937, which provided that “no action or suit for the recovery of any money which
is recoverable as a liquidated demand or debt in respect of any claim enforceable by virtue of any
rule of law or equity or by virtue of any statute ... shall be taken ... by any person whomsoever
against a resident debtor in any case” without permission from the Board.61 The Court was tasked
with deciding whether section 8 was applicable in cases of a right of action on a promissory note,
which falls under federal jurisdiction by section 91(18) of the BNA Act.62 The Court, in its
December 1940 decision, found that section 8, insofar as it applied to bills of exchange and
promissory notes, was ultra vires the Province of Alberta.63
Alberta continued to face judicial challenges to the legislation, which it vigorously
defended. Several months later, in March 1941, Justice O’Connor of the Supreme Court of Alberta
decided that the Debt Adjustment Act, 1937 was ultra vires in whole as legislation in relation to
bankruptcy and insolvency, another area of federal jurisdiction.64 In that case, a creditor had
brought an action to enforce a debt against the debtor, McLean, whose sole defence was that a
permit had not been obtained under section 8 of the Debt Adjustment Act, 1937. The creditor argued
that the Act was ultra vires.65 On the same day as O’Connor’s judgment, Alberta enacted the Legal
60

Mutual Life Assurance Co v Levitt, [1939] 2 DLR 324 at para 14, 1 WWR 530. In 1932 the Saskatchewan Court of
King’s Bench noted the reason for the debt adjustment legislation in that province: “[t]hat there is throughout this
province a general depression is, sad to say, so notorious a fact that I should and do take judicial notice thereof. The
effect of this depression is that debtors are too often unable to pay their open accounts; mortgages have fallen into
arrears; taxes remain unpaid, and unless the Legislature intervened there was danger that a great many residents of
Saskatchewan would lose their lands.” Eddy v Stewart, [1932] 2 WWR 699 at para 14, 1932 CanLII 235 (SK QB)
(reversed on appeal, but not specifically on that point).
61
See Debt Adjustment Act, 1937, supra note 50, s 8.
62
See Alberta (Attorney General) and Winstanley v Atlas Lumber Co, [1941] SCR 87, [1941] 1 DLR 625 [Winstanley];
British North America Act, 1867, 30-31 Vict, c 3 (UK) [BNA Act].
63
See Winstanley, supra note 62 at 94. Under the BNA Act, Parliament has jurisdiction over virtually all aspects of
negotiable instruments and currency, notably in s 91(14) (currency and coinage), s 91(15) (issue of paper money),
91(18) (bills of exchange and promissory notes), and s 91(20) (legal tender). In Winstanley, the SCC decided that the
DAA’s interference with actions for the enforcement of bills of exchange and promissory notes was repugnant to the
federal Bills of Exchange Act, RSC 1927, c 16.
64
See North American Life Assurance Co v McLean, [1941] 1 WWR 430, [1941] 3 DLR 271 [McLean].
65
Ibid at 430.
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Proceedings Suspension Act, 1941,66 which stayed all judgments calling into question the validity
of the Debt Adjustment Act, 1937 for 60 days, and if the province referred the question of
constitutionality to the Court, then the stay would continue until the final determination of the
reference or any appeal therefrom.67 The next month, O’Connor responded with a judgment that
the province could not stay a judgment relating to the validity of its own legislation, as that would
destroy the division of powers. He noted that the province could appeal the original judgment if it
liked.68
In an apparent response to O’Connor’s April judgment, Alberta enacted the Debt
Adjustment Act, 1937, Amendment Act, 194169 days later, which purported to remove the offending
portions of the Act. There is a parallel here with the history of the FCAA. Roughly a year after the
passage of that Act, British Columbia mounted a constitutional challenge against it, arguing that it
was invalid insofar as it affected provincial contracts and taxes.70 Although the federal cabinet had
been advised that the FCAA was constitutional, the government opted not to risk the benefits to
other provinces and amended the FCAA so that it no longer applied in British Columbia, thus
avoiding the Province’s challenge.71 While this approach of amending the statute to avoid a
constitutional challenge worked for the FCAA, the similar approach in the case of the DAA was
not ultimately successful.

6. Supreme Court of Canada
Roughly one month after Alberta attempt to fix the Debt Adjustment Act, 1937, Mackenzie
King’s government referred the validity of the Act to the SCC in May 1941. The reference
contained the following questions:
(1) Is The Debt Adjustment Act 1937, … ultra vires of the Legislature of Alberta, either in
whole or in part, and if so, in what particular or particulars or to what extent?
(2) Is the said Act as amended operative in respect of any action or suit for the recovery of
moneys alleged to be owing under or in respect of any bill of exchange or promissory note?
(3) Is the said Act as amended operative in respect of any proceedings taken to enforce any
judgment obtained in any action or suit for the recovery of moneys owing under or in
respect of any bill of exchange or promissory note?
(4) Is the said Act as amended operative in respect of any action or suit for the recovery of
money or interest thereon, or both, not being money or interest alleged to be owing under
or in respect of any bill of exchange or promissory note, whether or not such money or
interest is secured upon land situated in the said province, in the following cases, namely,
where such action or suit is for the recovery of:
(a) The principal amount of such money and interest, if any, where the same are
payable in the said province;
(b) The principal amount of such money and interest, if any, where the same are
payable outside the said province;
(c) The interest only upon such money.
66

Legal Proceedings Suspension Act, 1941, SA 1941, c 3.
Ibid, s 2.
68
See North American Life Assurance Co v McLean, [1941] 1 WWR 588 at paras 5-9, 1941 CarswellAlta 21.
69
See Debt Adjustment Act, 1937, Amendment Act, 1941, supra note 45.
70
See Telfer & Torrie, supra note 6 at 113.
71
Ibid at 114.
67
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(5) If the answer to any of the parts (a), (b) and (c) of question 4 is answered in the negative,
is the said Act as amended operative in respect of any proceedings taken to enforce any
judgment obtained in any action or suit in respect of which such answer is given?
The key issue before the SCC was whether the DAA was valid provincial law under
Alberta’s jurisdiction over property and civil rights or whether the Act trenched on federal
jurisdiction over bankruptcy and insolvency. Canada argued that the DAA was insolvency
legislation because the Debt Adjustment Board’s mandate to bring about debtor-creditor
compromises coupled with its ability to bar actions from the courts effectively created a system of
compulsory arrangements, which had been held as a key characteristic of insolvency legislation in
the 1894 decision of the Privy Council in the Voluntary Assignments Case.72 In that decision,
which took place during a period when there were no federal bankruptcy or insolvency statutes the
Privy Council held that an Ontario statute which provided for the voluntary assignments of debts
was valid provincial law.73 A vital element of the Voluntary Assignments Case was that the
provincial statute, by dealing only with voluntary assignments, did not infringe on the federal
power.74 In the present case, Alberta argued that the Board’s power not only did not deal with
compulsory assignments, but also did not deal with voluntary assignments, which had by then been
included in federal bankruptcy legislation. Instead, Alberta suggested that the Act dealt with
voluntary settlements, which could occur entirely separately from an act of bankruptcy. As will be
seen below, the combination of the Board’s powers did result in an element of compulsion such
that the Act entered the sphere of bankruptcy legislation. Thus, the striking down of the provincial
statute affirmed a broad conception of bankruptcy and insolvency which can include areas
normally related to property and civil rights when the hallmarks of bankruptcy are present.
The SCC began hearing the arguments in June 1941 and its judgment was delivered in
December of the same year.

6.1 Arguments
6.1.1 Alberta and Saskatchewan
At the SCC, Alberta primarily argued that the Debt Adjustment Act, 1937 was intra vires
as legislation in relation to property and civil rights and the administration of justice. The province
also submitted that the Act was not in relation to any federal heads of power, namely bankruptcy
and insolvency, bills of exchange and promissory notes, and interest. If any part of the Act were
found ultra vires, Alberta submitted that it was severable, and the remaining parts were valid.
Saskatchewan’s factum merely adopted that of Alberta.
First, Alberta attempted to justify the DAA under the provincial power over “property and
civil rights.”75 It argued that the words “civil rights” included rights arising from contract and that
the words were used in their largest sense.76 The province also argued that the DAA did not deal
with any civil rights outside the province. It did not prevent actions brought outside the province,
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and a right of action in a province is a civil right within that province.77 Section 8 of the DAA was
only procedural and did not affect any substantive rights between debtors and creditors. Even so,
substantive rights outside the province could be affected as long as it was only incidentally.78
Second, Alberta situated sections 8 and 26 of the DAA within the provincial power over the
“administration of justice” in section 92(14) of the BNA Act.79 It suggested that the section
conferred on the provinces the right to regulate and provide for the whole machinery connected
with the administration of justice in the province. Everything not covered by section 96, 100, and
101 of the BNA Act remained to be dealt with by the province.80 In addition, Alberta argued that
the province’s jurisdiction over the administration of justice included the ability to destroy a right
of action, take away and grant jurisdiction to the courts, and to place restrictions on bringing
actions in provincial courts.81
Next, Alberta argued that the DAA did not fall under any of the federal heads of power
enumerated in section 91 of the BNA Act. It argued at the outset that if a statute falls in pith and
substance within section 92, it is immaterial that it may affect matters in section 91.82 It submitted
that the pith and substance of the Act was the postponement of debts payments in order to prevent
undue hardship on debtors.83
Of the federal heads of power, Alberta first argued that the DAA did not fall within section
91(21), bankruptcy and insolvency. It submitted that the Act did not relate to bankrupt or insolvent
persons. Many of the provisions that were found in McLean84 to be in relation to insolvency were
removed. The Act was intended to be supplemental to the Bankruptcy Act and the FCAA, but did
not invade on the field of bankruptcy and insolvency.85 Alberta suggested that there were other
grounds for the postponement of debt. For example, under section 9 of the DAA, if an insolvent
debtor was being forced to sell their property in order to pay their debt, the enforcement could be
delayed.86 Section 8 of the DAA did not refer to bankruptcy or insolvency, and if a debtor had
become subject to the Bankruptcy Act, section 8 no longer applied.87 The second part of the Act
enabled the Board to attempt to bring about voluntary settlements, which had no condition of
bankruptcy or insolvency.88 The Act did not have to do with voluntary assignments, which were
covered under the Bankruptcy Act. Instead, the DAA dealt with compositions which were only
ancillary to bankruptcy legislation if made before an act of bankruptcy.89 All provinces had statutes
relating to the enforcement of judgments, and these had never been found invalid in relation to
77
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bankruptcy, even though the justification for such proceedings generally consisted of an act of
bankruptcy.90 In addition, Alberta argued it was established that simply because a debtor who may
become insolvent is relieved by legislation does not mean that the legislation was within the legal
category of insolvency.91
Second, Alberta argued that the DAA was not in relation to bills of exchange and
promissory notes. The province noted that Winstanley must be accepted as definitely deciding that
section 8(a) of the DAA was found to be ultra vires or superseded by the Bills of Exchange Act.92
Alberta stated that it would not argue the contrary, but then proceeded to submit that the DAA was
not in conflict with the Bills of Exchange Act and that the dissent in Winstanley was correct. It
further submitted that the DAA was not in relation to the federal power over bills of exchange and
promissory notes, and that if the Bills of Exchange Act was in conflict with the DAA, the former
would be ultra vires to that extent.93 Alberta argued that when a holder of a promissory note sues
and obtains judgment, their rights have ceased to be those of a holder of a promissory note and
become those of a judgment creditor. Therefore, the DAA applied to judgments of the provincial
courts and not promissory notes qua promissory notes.94
Finally, Alberta submitted that if any part of the Act were found ultra vires it would be
severable, and the remaining part would be valid. It argued that the purpose of the Act was to give
relief to debtors and farmers, and the invalidity of one part was not a reason to discard the
remainder.95
6.1.2 Canada
Canada argued that the DAA was ultra vires in whole. It first noted that if a provincial
statute is not authorized under section 92 of the BNA Act it is ultra vires.96 Canada then argued
that the DAA was not legislation in relation to property and civil rights. In its view, the Act simply
provided that nobody had access to the courts to enforce their rights without permission from a
creature of the local government. A large portion of the frozen rights were not “civil rights in the
province” within the meaning of section 92(13) of the BNA Act, as “civil rights in the province”
could not include any civil rights that fall within section 91.97 The DAA applied to a wide array of
federal civil rights as well, over which the province did not have the jurisdiction to legislate. The
province also could not make such rights inoperative by taking away the means by which they can
be enforced. The intention of the legislature was to regulate provincial as well as federal civil
rights, which could not be justified under s 92(13). Section 39 of the DAA, which said that the Act
should not be construed to be outside the competence of the province did not change the true
character of the legislation.98
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Next, Canada argued that the DAA was not in relation to the administration of justice in the
province. It argued that a statute which denies access to the courts except with the permission of
an administration controlled only by its own arbitrary discretion was an effort to establish a new
legal order or system in Alberta. Section 92(14) of the BNA Act did not grant authority to the
province to substitute for its judicial system an alternative system whereby an administrative body
was given the power to decide in what cases the judicial system functions.99 Likely in apprehension
of Alberta’s argument that the DAA dealt only with procedure, Canada argued that the statute was
not in relation to procedure, as the right to bring an action is a substantive right. The fact that the
protection in the DAA was limited to residents of the province was discriminatory and showed that
the pith and substance was not the administration of justice nor civil procedure. It would be a
contradiction to say that a statute which arbitrarily denies access to the courts was in relation to
the administration of justice.100
Canada then argued that the real focus of the DAA was bankruptcy and insolvency. It noted
that the Board had full power to allow or not to allow creditors to begin proceedings and permission
could be recalled at any time. There were no rules governing the discretion of the Board and the
only appeal was to a jury with equally uncontrolled discretion.101 The Board was given the duty to
arrange compromises between debtors and creditors and the power of the Board was obviously
dictatorial. The power was very close to what was given to the Boards of Review under the FCAA,
which was valid as legislation in relation to bankruptcy and insolvency.102 Under the provincial
legislation the Board could compel a creditor’s consent by refusing to let a creditor sue and could
compel a debtor’s consent by granting permission to the creditor to sue in full.103
Finally, Canada submitted that no provision of the DAA was severable, so the whole statute
should be found ultra vires.104
6.1.3 Canadian Bankers’ Association and Mortgage and Loans Association of Alberta
The CBA and Mortgage Loans Association of Alberta (“MLAA”) argued that the
provincial legislation was ultra vires. Like Canada, the CBA and the Mortgage and Loans
Association of Alberta (“MLAA”) argued in separate factums that the DAA was not legislation in
relation to property and civil rights or administration of justice. They argued that instead, the Act
was in relation to bankruptcy and insolvency. In relation to property and civil rights, the two
Associations argued that the aim of the Act was to protect residents from claims over which the
province had no authority to legislate by refusing access to the courts and stopping actions already
commenced. This would make areas of federal jurisdiction ineffective, which would be a
destruction of the scheme of the BNA Act.105
Likewise, the Associations argued that the DAA could not be justified under sections 92(14)
and 92(16) of the BNA Act, which included the administration of justice and matters of a merely
local nature, respectively. They submitted that instead of dealing with the administration of justice,
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the Act prevented access to the court except with permission of a purely administrative body.106
The MLAA argued that the power to administer justice did not involve the power to deny justice,
nor did it include setting up an administrative body to exclude creditors from the courts. The courts
must be available to enforce federal civil rights, otherwise such rights would be meaningless.107
The CBA was also concerned with the stability of the banking industry. It suggested that
because the banking system involves a large amount of lending, if the collection of debts was
rendered impossible, the banks themselves may not be able to repay their depositors and meet
other obligations. If this situation would continue in all provinces, the banking business as a whole
would be frustrated.108 The MLAA added that the right of a federal corporation to sue could not
be taken away by provincial legislation, as it was of vital importance to the existence of all
companies engaged in trade.109
Next, the Associations argued that the Act trenched on bankruptcy and insolvency. The
purpose of the Act was to deprive creditors of rights under the Bankruptcy Act unless permission
from the Board was obtained. The Act had already been held ultra vires as legislation in relation
to bankruptcy and insolvency in McLean.110 Following that case Alberta removed certain sections
that were addressed in that decision, but it did not remove all of the objectionable provisions, as
the power of the Board was not limited and the principles of the Act were not changed.111 The Act
invaded the field of bankruptcy and insolvency and was an attempt to deal with matters already
addressed by federal legislation.112 The legislative history of the Act demonstrated a continued
effort to take away the rights of creditors against individual debtors in the province.113
Finally, the CBA noted that after Winstanley it was unnecessary to emphasize that the Act
was ultra vires in relation to bills of exchange and promissory notes.114 Parliament intended to
give holders of bills of exchange and promissory notes the right not only to obtain judgment, but
also to enforce judgment. Therefore, the Act impaired that area of federal jurisdiction as well.115

6.2 SCC Decision
Chief Justice Duff, who had written the decision in the FCAA Reference and the other New
Deal references, wrote the SCC’s majority decision that the DAA was ultra vires as legislation in
relation to bankruptcy and insolvency. Duff was joined in his judgment by Justices Rinfret, Davis,
Kerwin, Hudson, and Taschereau. Rinfret, who became the Chief Justice shortly after in 1944, was
a defender of provincial jurisdiction and had not found justification for any federal law until the
FCAA Reference.116 Kerwin and Taschereau would also later become Chief Justices of the
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Supreme Court in 1954 and 1963, respectively.117 Justice Crocket, who had been on the Supreme
Court bench since 1932 and retired shortly after the reference in 1943, wrote the dissent.118
6.2.1 Majority
The majority of the court found that the DAA was ultra vires in whole. Duff wrote that
section 8 allowed the Board to postpone the enforcement of debts arising from statutes or legal
rules which the legislature had no power to vary and with reference to creditors whose power and
status the legislature was incompetent to regulate.119 He characterised the Debt Adjustment Board
as wielding arbitrary discretion which could be exercised by a single member. The Act provided
no principal or rule for the decision-making of the Board, and so it was empowered in each case
to make an arbitrary determination. The appeal to a jury was equally arbitrary.120
Duff decided that an enactment which takes away the remedy of action is more than an
enactment relation to procedure; it strikes at the substance of a creditor’s rights. Section 8 was
repugnant to federal statutes relating to matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament.
The provision also fundamentally impaired certain undertakings over which Parliament has
exclusive control.121
Debts falling entirely within the legislative authority of the province could be dealt with by
an enactment with the characteristics of section 8, but in this case, it could not be construed to be
limited to such debts.122 The Board could refuse to permit the execution of a debt the province had
no authority to regulate.123 The true pith and substance of the legislation was to establish a board
empowered to exercise discriminatory power. While the form was in relation to remedy and
procedure, it was really designed to regulate the rights themselves.124
It was within the exclusive power of Parliament to legislate on companies with other than
provincial objects. Provinces could affect these companies by laws of general application, but the
authority of the Board to interfere with these companies in section 8 was not a law of general
application in this sense.125
Section 8 of the DAA was also repugnant to section 2 of the Interest Act,126 and section 26,
by dealing with arrangements under the FCAA, was likewise outside of provincial jurisdiction.127
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Duff then considered the impact of the Act on the field of bankruptcy and insolvency and
found that it did indeed invade the field. Section 8 took away a remedy given by law for the
enforcement of debts and substituted a remedy dependent on the arbitrary consent of the Board. In
addition, the remedy struck at the debt itself, such that for any obligation to which the Act applied
there could be no “debt owing” within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, thus preventing any
involuntary petitions under that Act.128 The Act also contemplated the use of the Board’s power
under section 8 to secure compulsory arrangements for composition and settlement. These were
powers normally used when a state of insolvency existed. The Board was empowered to impose
on an insolvent debtor and their creditors a settlement which the creditors must accept to proceed
with any claim.129
While Duff agreed that the aims of the legislation were “laudable” the statute was an
attempt to “invade” the Dominion’s field of bankruptcy and insolvency law:
Indeed the whole statute is conceived as a means of protecting embarrassed debtors who
are residents of Alberta. Most people would agree that in this point of view the motives
prompting the legislation may be laudable ones. But the Legislature, in seeking to attain its
object, seems to have entered upon a field not open to it. The statute, if valid, enables the
Board (invested with exclusive possession of the key to the Courts) to employ its position
and powers coercively in compelling the creditors of an insolvent debtor and the debtor
himself to consent to a disposition of the resources of the debtor prescribed by the Board.
In this way the statute seeks to empower the Board to impose upon the insolvent debtor
and his creditors a settlement of his affairs, which the creditors must accept in satisfaction
of their claims. I cannot escape the conclusion that the statute contemplates the use of the
powers of the Board in this way. I think this is an attempt to invade the field reserved to
the Dominion under Bankruptcy and Insolvency.130
Duff noted that while it may be true that a board might lawfully be constituted that had
some of these powers, it was impossible to disentangle what a legislature might validly enact from
the rest. There was no probability that the legislature would have enacted the statute in a truncated
form, therefore the statute was a whole was ultra vires.131
6.2.2 Dissent
Although his finding was qualified, Crocket decided that the DAA was valid provincial
legislation. He noted that provincial legislation on matters which fall within section 92 of the BNA
Act cannot be superseded by federal legislation unless the latter is necessarily incidental to a power
under section 91.132 In addition, the words “property and civil rights” in section 92(13) of the BNA
Act were used in their largest sense.133 Crocket found that the true purpose of the statute was to
regulate the enforcement of contractual obligations for payment of money to safeguard debtors
affected by abnormal economic conditions. Its provisions were predominantly in relation to
procedure in civil matters, which was within the province’s legislative power. The right to sue in
provincial courts was a civil right in the province whether the claim arose in the province or not.
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None of the provisions were in relation to bankruptcy, banks, or contracts of federally incorporated
companies, though they may be incidentally affected.134
Crocket argued that whether the power of the Board was arbitrary did not affect the
constitutionality of the enactment. Once it was clear that the enactment was within the competency
of the legislature, the courts had no concern as to the reasonableness of the enactment. He found
that the Act could not be a colourable device to do something beyond the province’s jurisdiction,
since section 39 said that the Act could not be construed as authorizing anything outside the
legislative competence of the province.135
Once he had determined that the Act was in pith and substance in relation to property and
civil rights, Crocket found that it could not be ultra vires merely because it may have affected
subjects under section 91 of the BNA Act, such as bankruptcy and insolvency.136 Therefore,
Crocket decided that the Act was not ultra vires, except as it may have conflicted with any existing
valid federal legislation in relation to section 91 of the BNA Act.137

7. Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
Following the SCC’s decision, the Alberta legislature enacted the Legal Proceedings
Suspension Act, 1942.138 Like the 1941 version,139 this Act attempted to stay all proceedings where
the validity of the DAA was at issue until the final determination on the DAA was made by the
Privy Council. The Province then referred the validity of the Act to the Alberta Supreme Court,
which decided that the Legal Proceedings Suspension Act, 1942 was ultra vires in whole because
it disrupted the scheme of the BNA Act by allowing the legislature to decide the limits of its own
power.140 Thus, Alberta’s only recourse to maintain the DAA was a successful appeal to the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council.
The Privy Council granted Alberta leave to appeal the SCC’s decision in May 1942, and
the appeal was heard starting in November of that year. Viscount Maugham, a former Lord
Chancellor, delivered the judgment of the Privy Council in February 1943. The Privy Council
considered the same constitutional questions as had the SCC. Canada responded to the appeal, and
the Canadian Bankers’ Association and the Mortgage Loans Association of Alberta submitted a
joint factum. Saskatchewan also submitted a factum with its own argument. This time, the
provinces of Manitoba, New Brunswick, and Ontario, joined the appeal as intervenors, but none
of them submitted their own written arguments. Manitoba and Ontario adopted the factum of
Alberta, and New Brunswick adopted the factums of Alberta and Saskatchewan.
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7.1 Arguments
7.1.1 Alberta and Saskatchewan
On appeal, Alberta argued that the SCC had been incorrect in deciding that the DAA was
ultra vires.141 Saskatchewan made similar arguments as Alberta. After giving a summary of the
DAA, the other parties’ submissions, and the SCC decision, both Provinces argued that the pith
and substance of the DAA was in relation to the postponement of payment of certain debts in order
to prevent undue hardship from a forced sale at less than fair market value.142 They submitted that
the Act came within sections 92(13), (14), and (16) of the BNA Act and was not in relation to any
subject enumerated under section 91. If any provisions were ultra vires, they were severable from
the remaining parts and if the Act invaded any area under section 91 it only did not incidentally.143
The Provinces argued that the Act was valid regarding all property and civil rights in the
province, but if it invaded any field already occupied by Parliament, the operation of the Act should
be limited to the legislative competence of the province, relying on section 39 of the Act, which
provided as such.144
7.1.2 Canada
After summarizing the DAA and the SCC decision, Canada outlined several principles that
were important to the appeal:
1. If a provincial statute is not in relation to sections 92, 93, or 95 of the BNA Act it is
ultra vires.145
2. If the provincial statute prima facie falls within section 92, it will not be valid if it also
falls within section 91, as subjects under section 91 are excluded from section 92.146
3. If the provincial statute falls within section 91 it will be ultra vires even if Parliament
has not legislated on the subject. The rule that legislation may be enacted by a province
in one respect and by Parliament in another aspect is limited to the field in which
Parliament may enact ancillary legislation and does not apply to the field of legislation
assigned exclusively to Parliament.147
4. The legislative heads under section 92 must not be interpreted to include the heads
under section 91. Even when legislating under section 92, a province cannot enact
legislation that is inconsistent with provisions under the BNA Act other than section
91.148
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5. To apply these principles, one must look to the pith and substance of the legislation.
One must consider the effect and the purpose of the legislation and whether there is an
attempt by Parliament or the province to carry out a purpose that is beyond its power.149
Canada argued that the effect and purpose of the DAA could not be justified under section
92 of the BNA Act, so it was ultra vires. It could not fall within the scope of section 92(13) because
“civil rights in the province” could not be given such an unrestricted meaning. Civil rights that fall
within section 91 were necessarily excluded. However, the purpose and effect of the DAA was to
replace both provincial and federal civil rights with conditional rights. The Act empowered the
Debt Adjustment Board to use its discretion to regulate rights which the province could not
regulate directly. These effects were not incidental. The entire operation of the statute applied to
civil rights which the province could not regulate.150
Canada also submitted that the Act could not be in relation to section 92(14) because it was
not open to one legislative body to completely control a citizen’s right to access the court in matters
within the jurisdiction of the other legislative body. A province’s authority of the administration
of justice did not grant to the province the power to substitute for the judicial system a system
where another body had absolute and arbitrary power to decide in what cases the judicial system
could function. The pith and substance of the Act was to create a new system in denial of the
system contemplated by the BNA Act.151 In addition, the powers of the Board did not relate to the
administration of justice. The Board was guided by no rules or principles and constituted a new
method of affecting the rights of citizens. It could regulate rights created by Parliament, and in this
way the province was seeking to do indirectly what it could not do directly. The power to legislate
in relation to procedure did not include the power to prohibit actions.152
Canada argued that even if the Act were to fall prima facie under section 92, it would still
be ultra vires because it constituted an invasion of many legislative fields exclusive given to
Parliament. The Board was given the power to prevent the enforcement of federal rights and no
principles were given to limit the exercise of this power.153 The object of the Act was to grant relief
for debtors who were unable to pay their debts, so it was legislation in relation to bankruptcy and
insolvency. The true nature and character of the Act was to create a scheme similar to the FCAA,
the purpose of which was to adjust debts of persons unable to pay. Canada suggested that the
reason there were no rules given to the Board was that the rules would necessarily relate to
bankruptcy and insolvency and would make them plainly invalid. Any attempt of a province to
legislate in relation to bankruptcy and insolvency is ultra vires, even if the field has not been
occupied by Parliament. In this case, the field was occupied and whole scheme of the DAA was
repugnant to Parliament’s legislation.154
Finally, Canada argued that if the Act was not ultra vires in whole, it was ultra vires insofar
as it dealt with civil rights excluded from section 92. The Act was ultra vires in relation to bills of
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exchange and promissory notes and interest and could not be operative in respect of those
matters.155
7.1.3 Canadian Banker’s Association and Mortgage Loans Association of Alberta
On appeal to the Privy Council, the CBA and the MLAA submitted a joint factum. The
Associations argued that the Act made no exception for the chartered banks, governed by
Parliament in its jurisdiction over banking granted by section 91(15) of the BNA Act. If the
collection of debts were made impossible, banks might be unable to meet their own obligations,
which would cause chaos throughout Canada.156
They submitted that the legislation did not fall under section 92 and instead fell under
section 91 of the BNA Act. The Act did not deal with property and civil rights in the province, as
it attempted to protect residents from claims over which the province had no legislative authority
by refusing access to the courts except with permission of a purely administrative body. The Act
also did not deal with section 92(14), as preventing access to the courts was far removed from
“administration of justice.”157
In addition, the Act invaded the field of bankruptcy and insolvency, given exclusively to
the federal government. The Debt Adjustment Board would normally be used when a state of
insolvency existed and it was empowered to compel creditors and debtors to consent to the
disposition prescribed by the Board.158 The Associations also argued that the Act invaded
Parliament’s jurisdiction over trade and commerce, currency and coinage, banking and the
incorporation of banks, savings banks, weights and measures, bills of exchange and promissory
notes, interest, and legal tender.159
Finally, the Associations submitted that even if the Act were not ultra vires in whole, it
would not be operative in relation to bills of exchange and promissory notes or interest. In addition,
if any part of the Act was ultra vires, it was not severable.160 For that argument, the Associations
relied on Duff’s decision where he stated, “it is impossible in this legislation to disentangle what
a provincial Legislature might competently enact.”161

7.2 Decision
Viscount Maugham delivered the decision of the Privy Council and determined that the
DAA was ultra vires in whole. He began by noting that the DAA was the most recent of a series of
legislative attempts to help resident farmers while keeping within the legislative powers of the
province. Maugham acknowledged that the legislation had been passed as a result of “[d]istress of
a very serious nature was rife in Alberta and the adjoining prairie Provinces from at any rate the
year 1920.”162 He stated that he made no comment on the expediency or wisdom of the Act, only
the validity:
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Their Lordships approach the important questions before them on the assumption that there
was sufficient and it may be said grave need for legislation for the relief of distress in the
Province. They desire, however, to point out that the question before them is not as to the
expediency, still less as to the wisdom, of the present Act. The question is simply one as to
the power of the Province to pass it.163
Some provisions had been removed were previously found to encroach on bankruptcy and
insolvency, but the important provisions of section 8, which is the section that prohibited certain
actions without the permission of the Debt Adjustment Board, remained.164
Maugham noted that the principles of construction of the BNA Act were well established.
In the case of conflict between sections 91 and 92, the former prevails. Legislation coming in pith
and substance within section 91 cannot be in the legislative competence of the provinces under
section 92. In that case, it is immaterial whether or not Parliament has occupied the field. If
provincial legislation coming within section 92 also affects section 91 incidentally, the legislation
is valid unless Parliament chooses to occupy the field.165
After giving a summary of the history of bankruptcy legislation in Canada, Maugham
decided that in pith and substance the DAA was legislation in relation to insolvency, which was in
the exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament. He found that the purpose was to relieve persons from an
enforceable liability to pay debts and to compel creditors to accept compositions approved by the
Debt Adjustment Board. The effect was to preclude anyone from accessing the courts to enforce
the rights without permission of the Board, which may never be obtained. This did not wholly
destroy the rights of creditors, but deprived them of the remedies by which those rights could be
enforced. The main purpose was to relieve debtors when they were unable to pay their debts as
they became due.166 The Board had the duty to bring about arrangements between debtors and
creditors, and it was impossible to escape the conclusion that the Act contemplated the use of
section 8 to compel the consent of the parties to the proposed arrangement. The Act also prevented
a creditor from presenting a bankruptcy petition under the Bankruptcy Act, as noted by Duff in his
decision.167
Maugham found that the Act as a whole constituted an invasion on Parliament’s powers in
relation to bankruptcy and insolvency and interfered with Parliament’s legislation on that subject:
On these grounds their Lordships have come to the conclusion, in agreement with the
Supreme Court on the one hand, that the Act as a whole constitutes a serious and substantial
invasion of the exclusive legislative powers of the Parliament of Canada in relation to
bankruptcy and insolvency, and on the other hand that it obstructs and interferes with the
actual legislation of that Parliament on those matters.168
Even if some parts related to bankruptcy and insolvency only incidentally it would not avail the
province, as the provincial legislature was precluded from entering that federally occupied field.169
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Having arrived at that conclusion, Maugham found that it was not necessary to address the
other matters discussed in the SCC judgment.170Therefore, the opinion of the SCC was affirmed.

8. Reactions and Impact of the Case
In 1943, a note authored by “B L,” was published in the University of Toronto Law Journal
which criticized the courts’ approach to the DAA. In particular, the author disparaged the use of
the doctrine of colourability in Duff’s decision and in the Alberta Supreme Court decisions on the
matter.171 Generally speaking, this constitutional doctrine applies when a legislature passes a
statute that purports to deal with an issue within its jurisdiction but is really a disguised attempt to
address an issue that is outside its jurisdiction. Put another way, the doctrine means that “you
cannot do that indirectly which you are prohibited from doing directly.”172 B L characterized the
doctrine as follows:
[The doctrine of colourability] offers a facile method of invalidating legislation while
strengthening judicial control over legislative policies… Any wide use of the principle of
colourability must deepen the suspicion that constitutional limitations are merely the
formal means by which courts pass on the wisdom of legislation.173
Peter Hogg, the constitutional scholar, has noted more diplomatically that the doctrine of
colourability has been criticized for the very fine line between adjudicating on policy and
adjudicating on validity, as the adjective “colourable” connotes judicial disapproval of the policy
of the statute, or at least of how the legislature brought about the policy.174
The result of the DAA Reference was not entirely favourable to creditors’ interests. One
feature of the DAA had been to postpone any effect of the Limitations of Actions Act on any claims
while the DAA was in effect. Because that provision was contained in the DAA itself, the
determination that the Act as a whole was ultra vires meant that many claims would now be
permanently time barred. 175 An editorial in The Calgary Herald argued that the legislature could
not plead ignorance that the DAA was ultra vires and its persistence could result in great loss to
many creditors. The author of the editorial called on the legislature to fix the issue of time barred
claims in the next legislative session.176 Other than this procedural issue, creditors were greatly
satisfied by the decision, as it would finally allow them to pursue claims for the enforcement of
debts. Even so, J M Macdonnell of the DMIA stated that there would be no rush to foreclosure,
but it would be expected that some actions would be pursued against borrowers who were able to
pay but had been hiding behind the legislation.177 Thus, the Privy Council achieved an outcome
that served to benefit creditors, just like in the Voluntary Assignments Case. In that decision the
Privy Council pragmatically protected commercial certainty by upholding a provincial statute with
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allowed for the arrangements of debts in a time when there was no federal bankruptcy statute to
achieve a similar purpose.178 In this case, the Privy Council protected commercial certainty by
striking down a provincial statute which prevented the enforcement of debts. The result
demonstrated a continued preference in division of powers questions towards jurisdictional
exclusivity as opposed to overlap, which created further regulatory unity by reducing provincial
variations in the law of debt enforcement. This emphasis on jurisdictional exclusivity in classical
federalism has become less common in modern analysis as courts now prefer “cooperative
federalism” as well as a context-specific approach to resolve division of powers problems.179
The political aftermath of the Privy Council’s decision would likely have been different if
the economic condition of agriculture had been as depressed as in the mid-1930s, but by 1943
improving crop yields and favourable prices had started to bring the prairie provinces back to
economic parity with the rest of Canada.180 Therefore, the public pressure on provincial
governments to introduce debt adjustment legislation was lessened. It had also become clear that
the provinces lacked the jurisdiction to enact the expansive debt adjustment schemes that they
desired. Provincial attempts to address over-indebtedness did not end with the DAA but changed
in character. Saskatchewan, which had a statute very similar to Alberta’s DAA, enacted the
Provincial Mediation Board Act181 shortly after the Privy Council’s 1943 decision, which created
a board that could only assist with voluntary settlements.182 In addition, Saskatchewan enacted the
Farm Security Act, 1944,183 part of which, in its creative attempt to assist farmers, was found ultra
vires for infringing on the federal power over interest.184

9. Conclusion
After the Privy Council affirmed the SCC’s decision that the DAA was ultra vires, the
prairie provinces attempted to secure an agreement with the federal government to enact long term
debt adjustment legislation. That same February, representatives of Alberta, Saskatchewan, and
Manitoba met at the Inter-Provincial Debt Conference and agreed on a draft bill specifically to
address farm debt. The proposed Act would have established a system of provincial boards similar
in structure to those created by the FCAA. On application of a farmer, the board would have the
power to formulate settlements for the purpose of ensuring that the farmer would continue to farm
the land and be an efficient producer.185 The board could alter payment terms, reduce the principal
or interest, and reduce the rate of interest on any debt without regard to the date the debt was
incurred.186 The provinces presented the bill to the federal cabinet, but instead of enacting new
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debt legislation, Parliament amended the FCAA.187 The key change was that while the prior FCAA
had provided that the Act would not apply to debts incurred after May 1, 1935, the new amendment
provided that debts incurred after May 1, 1935 could be included, as long as two thirds of the debt
had been incurred before that date.188 The Act also designated the Official Receiver as the Clerk
of the Court and shifted the role of the Board of Review to the courts in the province.189 Because
the new FCAA retained a restriction on what debts could be included, it was certainly not a far
reaching as the provinces had hoped from their draft bill.
On its own initiative to address continued over-indebtedness, Alberta passed the Debtors’
Assistance Act in March 1943, which repealed the Debt Adjustment Act.190 In the formulation of
this Act, the legislature plainly took note of Duff’s comments in the DAA Reference: “[i]t may be
that by apt legislation strictly limited to enactments relating exclusively to matters within the
legislative jurisdiction of a province, a Board might lawfully be constituted having some of the
powers which the Debt Adjustment Board receives under this legislation.”191 This was evidently
an attempt to reform the Debt Adjustment Board into something which did not overstep provincial
jurisdiction. The Act established the Debtors’ Assistance Board, which was tasked, inter alia, with
advising debtors in adjusting their debts and in working out arrangements with creditors, assisting
debtors in the preparation of a debt plan before any board or court, and generally advising debtors
through proceedings in the court or otherwise pressed for payment by creditors.192 The Debtors’
Assistance Board continues to exist to this day with largely the same powers and functions as it
did in 1943, although with more detailed procedures and processes.193 Its function of promoting
financial literacy is currently performed by the charity Money Mentors.
While Viscount Maugham had stressed that he only wished to comment on the
constitutionality of the enactment, Duff was clearly interested in the wisdom of the legislation as
well. He had stressed that it was most important “not to lose sight of the arbitrary nature of the
Board's authority.”194 Duff characterized both the Board and the appeal to a jury as arbitrary
exercises of authority, and found that the pith and substance of the Act was to create an authority
empowered to exercise discriminatory control.195 Crocket, writing in dissent, found that whether
the statute granted unreasonable or arbitrary power could not affect the constitutionality of the
enactment. He wrote:
[T]he courts have no concern as to the reasonableness or injustice of those provisions. If
an enactment is of such a palpably unfair character as to offend the public conscience, the
remedy lies, not with the courts of the country, but with the people to whom the Legislature
is responsible, or in the power of disallowance.196
Between these two justices there clearly was a difference in the extent to which they
thought the wisdom of a statute might affect its constitutionality. Whether or not Duff’s criticism
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of the legislative scheme itself was warranted, Maugham found that the Act was invalid without
commenting on the colourability or wisdom of it. He acknowledged that hardship and injustice
would follow from the result of the reference but noted that they could only be avoided by action
of the legislature of Alberta.197
The main significance DAA Reference was that it reinforced a broad construction of the
federal power over bankruptcy and insolvency and limited the scope of the provincial power over
property and civil rights. Duff’s decision in this case was the complement of his analysis in the
FCAA Reference, where he uncharacteristically justified a federal statute on a broad construction
of the federal jurisdiction over bankruptcy and insolvency.198 Here, he found that a provincial
statute could not be justified as legislation in regard to property and civil rights, cementing the idea
that the broad provincial power cannot be interpreted to include matters, conceivably connected to
property and civil rights, that are specifically granted to the federal Parliament. Duff affirmed that
the federal power includes compulsory arrangements made to relieve debtors of obligations when
they are in a “state of insolvency.”199 The DAA largely had the same purposes as the federal FCAA:
to protect the assets of debtor farmers so that they could continue farming. At the time of the FCAA
Reference, a policy objective of debtor rehabilitation and affordability was unprecedented in an
insolvency statute.200 Although neither the SCC nor the Privy Council directly incorporated the
FCAA Reference into their decisions, the finding that the FCAA was intra vires undoubtably
contributed to the determination that the DAA was ultra vires. Thus, the DAA Reference formed
an important counterpart to the Court’s decision in the FCAA Reference; the latter case established
a broad interpretation of the federal bankruptcy and insolvency power, while the former case
affirmed a concomitantly narrow interpretation of the provincial property and civil rights power
when dealing with the payment of debts in situations of insolvency.
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